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consideration norms which might be imposed on those actions. Normative
practical reasoning supports agents making decisions about what is best for
them to (not) do in a given situation. What makes practical reasoning chal-
lenging is the interplay between goals that agents are pursuing and the norms
that the agents are trying to uphold. We offer a formalisation to allow agents
to plan for multiple goals and norms in the presence of durative actions that
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notions (i.e. utility) such that the utility gain of goals and utility loss of norm
violations are the basis for this comparison. The set of optimal plans consists
of plans that maximise the overall utility, each of which can be chosen by the
agent to execute. We provide an implementation of our proposal in Answer
Set Programming, thus allowing us to state the original problem in terms
of a logic program that can be queried for solutions with specific properties.
The implementation is proven to be sound and complete.
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1. Introduction
Reasoning about what to do – known as practical reasoning – for an
agent pursuing different goals is a complicated task. When conducting prac-
tical reasoning, the agents might exhibit undesirable behaviour that was not
predicted. The necessity of controlling undesirable behaviour has given rise
to the concept of norms that offer a way to define ideal behaviour for au-
tonomous software agents in open environments. Such norms often define
obligations and prohibitions that express what the agent is obliged to do and
what the agent is prohibited from doing.
Depending on their computational interpretation, norms can be regarded
as soft or hard constraints. When modelled as hard constraints, the agent
subject to the norms is said to be regimented, in which case the agent has no
choice but blindly to follow the norms (Esteva et al., 2001). Although regi-
mentation guarantees norm compliance, it greatly restricts agent autonomy.
Moreover, having individual goals to pursue, self-interested agents might
not want to or might not be able to comply with the norms imposed on
them. Conversely, enforcement approaches, in which norms are modelled as
soft constraints, leave the choice of complying with or violating the norms
to the agent. However, in order to encourage norm compliance, there are
consequences associated, namely a punishment when agents violate a norm
(Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2005; Pitt et al., 2013) or a reward when agents comply
with a norm (Aldewereld et al., 2006). In some approaches (e.g., (Aldew-
ereld et al., 2006; Alrawagfeh and Meneguzzi, 2014; Oren et al., 2011)) there
is a utility gain/loss associated with respecting norm or not, whereas in the
pressured norm compliance approaches (e.g., (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2005)),
the choice to violate a norm or not is determined by how the norm affects
the satisfaction or hindrance of the agent’s goals.
Existing work (e.g. (Oren et al., 2011; Panagiotidi et al., 2012a; Criado
et al., 2010; Meneguzzi et al., 2015)) on normative practical reasoning using
enforcement either consider plan generation or plan selection where there
is a set of pre-generated plans available to the agent. In these works, the
attitude agents have toward norms is often one of compliance, meaning that
their plans are often selected or, in some approaches, customised, to ensure
norm compliance (e.g., Kollingbaum (2005); Alechina et al. (2012); Oren
et al. (2011)). We argue that in certain situations, an agent might be better
off violating a norm which, if followed, would make it impossible for the agent
to achieve an important goal or complying with a more important norm.
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In this paper we set out an approach for practical reasoning that considers
norms in both plan generation and plan selection. We extend current work
on normative plan generation such that the agent attempts to satisfy a set of
potentially conflicting goals in the presence of norms, as opposed to conven-
tional planning problems that generate plans for a single goal (Oren et al.,
2011; Panagiotidi et al., 2012a). Such an extension is made on top of STRIPS
(Fikes and Nilsson, 1971), the most established planning domain language
that lays the foundation of many automated planning languages. Addition-
ally, since in reality the actions are often non-atomic, our model allows for
planning with durative actions that can be executed concurrently. Through
our practical reasoning process agents consider all plans (i.e., sequences of
actions), including those leading to norm compliance and violation; each plan
gets an associated overall utility for its sequence of actions, goals satisfied,
and norms followed/violated, and agents can decide which of them to pursue
by comparing the relative importance of goals and norms via their utilities.
The plan an agent chooses to follow is not necessarily norm-compliant; how-
ever, our mechanism guarantees that the decision will maximise the overall
plan utility, and this justifies the occasional violation of norms as the plan is
followed. Both plan generation and plan selection mechanisms proposed in
this paper are implemented using Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Gelfond
and Lifschitz, 1988).
ASP is a declarative programming paradigm using logic programs under
Answer Set semantics. In this paradigm the user provides a description of a
problem and ASP works out how to solve the problem by returning answer
sets corresponding to problem solutions. The existence of efficient solvers to
generate the answers to the problems provided has increased the use of ASP
in different domains of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems such
as planning (Lifschitz, 2002) and normative reasoning (Cliffe et al., 2006;
Panagiotidi et al., 2012b). Several action and planning languages such as
event calculus (Kowalski and Sergot, 1986), A (and its descendants B and C
(Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1998), Temporal Action Logics (TAL) (Doherty et al.,
1998), have been implemented in ASP (Lee and Palla, 2012, 2014), indicating
that ASP is appropriate for reasoning about actions. This provides motive
and justification for an implementation of STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971)
that serves as the foundation of our model in ASP.
This paper is organised as follows. First we present a scenario in Section 2
which we use to illustrate the applicability of our approach. This is followed
by the formal model and its semantics in Section 3. The computational
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implementation of the model is provided in Section 4. After the discussion
of related work in Section 5, we conclude in Section 6.
2. Illustrative Scenario
To illustrate our approach and motivate the normative practical reasoning
model in the next section, we consider a scenario in which a software agent
acts as a supervisory system in a disaster recovery mission and supports
human decision-making in response to an emergency. The software agent’s
responsibility is to provide humans with different courses of actions available
and to help humans decide on which course of actions to follow. In our
scenario, the agent is to plan for a group of human actors who are in charge
of responding to an emergency caused by an earthquake. The agent monitors
the current situation (e.g., contamination of water, detection of shocks, etc.)
and devises potential plans to satisfy goals set by human actors. In our
scenario we assume the following two goals:
1. Running a hospital to help wounded people: this goal is fulfilled when
medics are present to offer help and they have access to water and
medicines.
2. Organising a survivors’ camp: this is fulfilled when the camp’s area is
secured and a shelter is built.
We also assume the two following norms that the agent has to consider while
devising plans to satisfy the goals above:
1. It is forbidden to built a shelter within 3 time units of detecting shocks.
The cost of violating this norm is 5 units.
2. It is obligatory to stop water distribution for 2 time units once poison
is detected in the water. The cost of violating this norm is 10 units.
The formulation of this scenario is provided in Appendix A.
3. A Model for Normative Practical Reasoning
In this research, we take STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson, 1971) as the basis
of our normative practical reasoning model. In STRIPS, a planning problem
is defined in terms of an initial state, a goal state and a set of operators
(e.g. actions). Each operator has a set of preconditions representing the
circumstances/context in which the operator can be executed, and a set
of postconditions that result from applying the operator. Any sequence of
actions that satisfies the goal is a solution to the planning problem. In order
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to capture the features of the normative practical reasoning problem that we
are going to model, we extend the classical planning problem by:
(i) replacing atomic actions with durative actions: often the nature of the
actions is non-atomic, which means that although executed atomically
in a state, the system state in which they finish executing is not neces-
sarily the same in which they started (Nunes et al., 1997). Refinement
of atomic actions to durative actions reflects the real time that a ma-
chine takes to execute certain actions, which is also known as “real-time
duration” of actions (Bo¨rger and Sta¨rk, 2003).
(ii) Allowing a set of potentially inconsistent goals instead of the conven-
tional single goal: the issue of planning for multiple goals distributed
among distinct agents is addressed in collaborative planning. We ad-
dress this issue for a single agent when handling multiple conflicting
goals.
(iii) Factoring in norms: having made a case for the importance of norms
in Section 1, we combine normative and practical reasoning. Just like
goals, a set of norms is not necessarily consistent, making it potentially
impossible for an agent to comply with all norms imposed on it.
A solution for a normative practical reasoning problem that features (i), (ii)
and (iii) is any sequence of actions that satisfies at least one goal. The agent
has the choice of violating or complying with norms triggered by execution
of a sequence of actions, while satisfying its goals. However, there may be
consequences either way that the agent has to foresee.
We explain the syntax and semantics of the model in Sections 3.2–3.6.
First, however, we present the architecture of our envisaged system in the
next section.
3.1. Architecture
The architecture, depicted in Figure 1, shows how re-planning can be con-
sidered if a plan in progress is interrupted due to a change in circumstances.
This change can be the result of a change in the environment or unexpected
actions of other agents in the system. As is customary in multi-agent sys-
tems, the agent will regularly check the viability of its plan. The frequency
depends on the type of system the agent is operating in, the agent’s com-
mitment to its intentions, and the impact of re-computation on the agent’s
overall performance.
When an agent decides that re-planning is in order, it will take the state
in which the plan is interrupted as the initial state for the new plan and its
5
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Figure 1: Overview of the System Architecture
current goal set as the goals to plan towards. The current goal set does not
have to be the same as the goal set the original plan was devised for. Goals
can already be achieved in the interrupted plan, previous goals may no longer
be relevant and others may have been added. Even if the goals remain the
same, the resulting new optimal plan might change due to changes in the
state of the system. Similarly, there might be new norms imposed on the
agent that will have to be considered in replanning.
We cater for agents which need to create their own individual plans.
However, in doing so, in multi-agent scenarios agents will inevitably interact
and interfere with each other’s plans. The overview of Figure 1 will cater
for this in two ways: (i) agents will notice the states being changed by other
agents (a way of indirect communication) and (ii) the “Observations” will also
contain interactions among agents (direct communication). Although we do
not explore these ideas in the present paper, we envisage that the outcome
of the indirect and direct interactions among agents could be represented
as norms, establishing, for instance, that a particular agent, in the current
context (i.e., power or organisational relationships, description of capabilities
and global goals, etc.), is forbidden or obliged to do something.
3.2. Syntax
We start this section by describing an extended STRIPS planning prob-
lem, defined in (Shams, 2016), that accommodates (i) durative actions; (ii) mul-
tiple goals and (iii) multiple norms.
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Definition 1 (Normative Practical Reasoning Problem). A normative prac-
tical reasoning problem is a tuple P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) where
(i) FL is a set of fluents;
(ii) ∆ is the initial state;
(iii) A is a finite, non-empty set of durative actions for the agent;
(iv) G is the agent’s set of goals;
(v) N is a set of norms.
We describe in the ensuing sections each of the components of a normative
practical reasoning problem.
3.2.1. Fluents and Initial State
FL is a set of domain fluents describing the domain the agent operates in.
A literal l is a fluent or its negation i.e. l = fl or l = ¬fl for some fl ∈ FL.
For a set of literals L, we define L+ = {fl |fl ∈ L} and L− = {fl | ¬fl ∈ L}
to denote the set of positive and negative fluents in L respectively. L is
well-defined if there exists no fluent fl ∈ FL such that fl ,¬fl ∈ L, i.e., if
L+ ∩ L− = ∅.
The semantics of the normative practical reasoning problem is defined
over a set of states Σ. A state s ⊆ FL is determined by set of fluents that
hold true at a given time, while the other fluents (those that are not present)
are considered to be false. A state s ∈ Σ satisfies fluent fl ∈ FL, denoted
s |= fl , if fl ∈ s. It satisfies its negation s |= ¬fl if fl 6∈ s. This notation
can be extended to a set of literals as follows: set X is satisfied in state s,
s |= X, when ∀x ∈ X, s |= x.
The set of fluents that hold at the initial state is denoted by ∆ ⊆ FL.
3.3. Durative Actions
The component A of our normative practical reasoning problem P =
(FL,∆, A,G,N) is a set of durative actions. A durative action has pre- and
post-conditions. The effects of an action (as captured by its post-conditions)
are not immediate, that is, it takes a non-zero period of time for the effects
of an action to take place.
Definition 2 (Durative Actions). A durative action a is a tuple 〈pr , ps , d〉
where pr and ps are possibly empty and finite sets of well-defined literals
representing respectively the pre- and post-conditions of the action, and d ∈
N, d > 0, is the duration of the action.
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Given an action a = 〈pr , ps , d〉 we may also refer to its three components
pr(a), ps(a) and da. Moreover, we use pr(a)
+ and pr(a)− to refer to, respec-
tively, the positive and negative literals in pr(a); similarly, we have ps(a)+
and ps(a)− to refer to respectively the positive and negative literals in ps(a).
An action a can be executed in a state s if its preconditions hold in that
state (i.e. s |= pr(a)). When modelling durative actions, there might be
several states between the start and end state of the action, during which
the action is said to be in progress. Some approaches take the view that it is
sufficient for the preconditions of the action to hold at the start state and it
does not matter whether they hold while the action is in progress (Knoblock,
1994), whereas others hold the view that the preconditions of an action should
be satisfied while the action is in progress (Blum and Furst, 1997). Moreover,
some planning languages, such as Planning Domain Description Language
(PDDL) (Garrido et al., 2002; Fox and Long, 2003), distinguish between
preconditions and those conditions that have to hold while the action is
in progress. The latter conditions are referred to as invariant conditions.
Having invariant conditions different from preconditions undoubtedly brings
more expressiveness to the planning language; however it comes at the price
of higher implementation complexity. In this paper we take the position that
the invariant conditions are the same as preconditions, which implies that the
preconditions have to be preserved throughout the execution of the action.
The postconditions of a durative action cause changes to the state s in
which the action ends. These changes are: adding the positive postconditions
ps(a)+ to s and deleting the negative postconditions ps(a)− from s. Thus,
for a state s in which action a ends, we have: s |= ps(a)+ and s 6|= ps(a)−.
Example 1. Action “buildShelter” is available to the agents in the scenario
described in Section 2. To build a shelter the agent has to secure and evacu-
ate the area and there is no Shock detected – these are represented as precon-
ditions areaSecured, evacuated and ¬ShockDetected, respectively. Once the
shelter is built the area does not have to remain evacuated. This is represented
as the positive postcondition shelterBuilt , while the negative postcondition of
this action is ¬evacuated. In our scenario, we model this action as taking 4
units of time (that is, if it is executed in state sk, it will end in state sk+4,).
buildShelter =
〈
areaSecured ,
evacuated ,
¬ShockDetected
 ,
{
shelterBuilt ,
¬evacuated
}
, 4
〉
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sk
areaSecured
evacuated
sk+4
shelterBuilt
buildShelter
3.4. Goals
Goals identify the state of affairs in the world that an agent wants to
achieve. Different types of goals and their characteristics have been classified
in the literature (van Riemsdijk et al., 2008). Achievement goals are the most
common type of goals modelled in the agent literature and have therefore
received the most attention (van Riemsdijk et al., 2008; de Boer et al., 2002;
Nigam and Leite, 2006; van Riemsdijk et al., 2002). goals for the purpose of
this research are achievement goals.
We define below the elements of the set G of P = (FL,∆, A,G,N).
Definition 3 (Goals). A goal g ∈ G is the pair 〈r, v〉, where r is a possibly
empty and finite set of well-defined literals representing the goal requirements,
and v ∈ N, v > 0, represents the utility/gain for achieving the goal.
Goal g’s requirements and value are denoted as r(g) and v(g), respectively.
Example 2. The goals from our illustrative scenario are formulated as below:
runningHospital =
〈
medicsPresent ,
waterSupplied ,
medicinesSupplied
 , 25
〉
organiseSurvivorCamp =
〈{
areaSecured ,
shelterBuilt
}
, 18
〉
3.5. Norms
In this section we specify what we refer to as a norm in this work. In
order to provide a context for the norm specification we explain how our norm
specification corresponds to the five elements identified by Criado (2012) that
distinguish norm specification languages.
1. Deontic Operators: We model a permissive society in which the agent
has complete knowledge of the domain of actions available. Everything
is permitted unless it is explicitly prohibited. The role of obligation
is to motivate the agent to execute a specific action and the role of
prohibition is to inhibit the agent from executing a particular action.
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2. Controls: Controls determine whether the deontic propositions operate
on actions, states or both. In this work we focus on action-based norms.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms: We use the enforcement mechanism pro-
posed by Shams et al. (2015) that is a combination of utility-based
(e.g., Oren et al. (2011); Panagiotidi et al. (2012a)) and pressure-based
(Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2005) compliance methods.
4. Conditional Expressions: Similar to the control element, we use actions
as conditional expressions. In other words, the norm condition is an
action that once executed, the agent is obliged to or prohibited from
executing the action that the norm targets.
5. Temporal Constraints: temporal constraints can be used to express
norm activation, termination, deadline, etc. The temporal constraint
we specify here is concerned with the deadline. The agent is expected
to comply with an obligation (execute a certain action) or a prohibition
(refrain from executing a specific action) before some deadline.
Having explained the properties of our norm specification language, we
now define the element N of problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N). N denotes a set
of conditional norms to which the agent is subject:
Definition 4 (Norms). N is a set of norms, each of which is a tuple of the
form n = 〈d o, acon, asub, dl, c〉, where
• d o ∈ {o, f}2 is the deontic operator determining the type of norm,
which can be an obligation or a prohibition;
• acon ∈ A is the durative action (cf. Def. 2) that activates the norm;
• asub ∈ A is the durative action (cf. Def. 2) that is the target of the
obligation or prohibition;
• dl ∈ N is the norm deadline relative to the activation condition, which
is the completion of the execution of the action acon; and
• c ∈ N is the penalty cost that will be applied if the norm is violated.
c(n) denotes the penalty cost of norm n.
An obligation norm states that executing action acon obliges the agent to
start/start and end the execution of asub within dl time units of the end of
execution of acon. Such an obligation is complied with if the agent starts or
2The symbols o and f are normally represented as respectively O and F in the Deontic
logic literature. However we have used lower case letters to make these consistent with
our implementation in the next section. Capital letters in the implementation language
are reserved for variables.
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starts and ends executing asub before the deadline and is violated otherwise.
A prohibition norm expresses that executing action acon prohibits the agent
from starting or starting and ending the execution of asub within dl time
units of the end of execution of acon. Such a prohibition is complied with if
the agent does not start or does not start and end executing asub before the
deadline and is violated otherwise.
Example 3. The norms in the illustrative scenario are formulated as below:
n1 = 〈f, detectShock, buildShelter, 3, 5〉
n2 = 〈o, detectPoison, stopWater, 2, 10〉
A norm can be activated multiple times in a sequence of action, generating
different instances of the original norm. To make sure different instances
are dealt with uniquely, we define instantiated norms. In each instance the
deadline is updated relative to the end of execution of the action that is the
condition of the norm.
Definition 5 (Instantiated Norm). An instantiation of norm n = 〈d o, acon,
asub, dl, c〉 is denoted as nins = 〈d o, acon, asub, dlins, c〉 where dlins = dl +
tacon + dacon. tacon is when action acon is executed and dacon is the duration of
acon.
We also denote an instantiation of a norm ni as n
′
i.
Example 4. Assume that in some sequence of action detectShock is executed
at time 3 (i.e. tacon = 3) and that the duration of this action is 1 (i.e.
dacon = 1). The instantiated version of norm
n1 = 〈f, detectShock , buildShelter , 3, 5〉
in this sequence of actions is
n′1 = 〈f, detectShock , buildShelter , 7, 5〉
Where dlins is calculated based on Def. 5
3.6. Semantics
Having explained the syntax of the model, we now focus on the seman-
tics. To this end, we need to describe given a normative practical reasoning
problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N):
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(i) What the possible courses of action for the agent are and what proper-
ties each course of action has. Properties are defined in terms of goals
that a sequence of action satisfies, norms it complies with and the norms
it violates. This item is discussed in Section 3.6.1.
(ii) What different type of conflicts the agent can experience while trying
to satisfy its goals and comply with the norms to which it is subject.
In Section 3.6.2 we explore this item.
(iii) What identifies a sequence of actions as a solution/plan for problem P .
Plans are defined in Section 3.6.3.
3.6.1. Sequences of Actions and their Properties
Let P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) be a normative practical reasoning problem.
Also let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 with ai ∈ A and tai ∈ Z+ be a sequence
of actions ai executed at time tai . The pair (ai, tai) reads as action ai is
executed at time tai ∈ Z+ s.t. ∀i < j, tai < taj . The total duration of a
sequence of actions, Makespan(pi), is defined in Equation 1.
Makespan(pi) = max (tai + dai) (1)
Actions in a sequence can be executed concurrently but they cannot start at
the same time. This is because the planning problem is defined for a single
agent and a single agent is not typically assumed to be able to start two
actions at the exact same instant. Also actions in the sequence should not
have concurrency conflicts, which are defined below. In our presentation we
need to check for the occurrence of specific pairs in a sequence of actions pi,
and we thus define the operator “∈̂” as
(a, ta) ∈̂ pi iff

pi = 〈(a, ta), . . . , (an, tn)〉 or
pi = 〈(a0, 0), . . . , (a, ta), . . . , (an, tn)〉 or
pi = 〈(a0, 0), . . . , (a, ta)〉
Temporary conflicts prevent the agent from executing two actions under
specific constraints, the most common one of which is time. Conflicts caused
by time, known as concurrency conflicts between actions, prevent actions
from being executed in an overlapping period of time. Blum and Furst (1997)
define that two actions ai and aj cannot be executed concurrently, if at least
one of the following holds:
1. The preconditions of ai and aj contradict each other:
∃r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. ¬r ∈ pr(aj) or
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∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. r ∈ pr(aj)
2. The postconditions of ai and aj contradict each other:
∃r ∈ ps(ai)+ s.t. ¬r ∈ ps(aj)− or
∃¬r ∈ ps(ai)− s.t. r ∈ ps(aj)+
3. The postconditions of ai contradict the preconditions of aj:
∃r ∈ ps(ai)+ s.t. ¬r ∈ pr(aj) or
∃¬r ∈ ps(ai)− s.t. r ∈ pr(aj)
4. The preconditions of ai are contradicted by the postconditions of aj:
∃r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. ¬r ∈ ps(aj)− or
∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. r ∈ ps(aj)+
We summarise the four conditions above in Definition 6, where we define
what are referred to as conflicting actions in the remainder of this work.
Definition 6 (Conflicting Actions). Actions ai and aj have a concurrency
conflict if the pre- or post-conditions of ai contradict the pre- or post-conditions
of aj. The set of conflicting actions is denoted as cf action :
cf action =
(ai, aj)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai)+,¬r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)−
or
∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai)−, r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)+
 (2)
Example 5. Assume action evacuate with the following specification:
evacuate =
〈{
populated ,
ShockDetected ,
}
,
{
evacuated ,
¬populated
}
, 5
〉
The pre- and post-conditions of this action are inconsistent with the pre- and
post-conditions of action buildShelter defined in Example 1:
buildShelter =
〈
areaSecured ,
evacuated ,
¬ShockDetected
 ,
{
shelterBuilt ,
¬evacuated
}
, 4
〉
Therefore, these two actions cannot be executed concurrently. However,
action evacuate effectively contributes to the preconditions of buildShelter ,
which means they can indeed be executed consecutively.
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Definition 7 (Sequence of States). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 be a
sequence of actions such that @(ai, tai), (aj, taj) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai +
dai , (ai, aj) ∈ cf action and let m = Makespan(pi). The execution of a sequence
of actions pi from a given starting state s0 = ∆ brings about a sequence of
states S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉 for every discrete time interval from 0 to m.
The transition relation between states is given by Def. 8. If action ai ends
at time k, state sk results from removing delete post-conditions and adding
add post-conditions of action ai to state sk−1. If there is no action ending at
sk, the state sk remains the same as sk−1. We first define Ak as the set of
action/time pairs such that the actions end at some specific state sk:
Ak = {(ai, tai) ∈ pi | k = tai + dai} (3)
Note that sk is always well-defined since two actions with inconsistent post-
conditions, according to Def. 6 belong to cf action so they cannot be executed
concurrently and thus they cannot end at the same state.
Definition 8 (State Transition). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 and let
S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉 be the sequence of states brought about by pi:
∀k > 0 : sk =
(sk−1 \ (
⋃
a∈Ak
ps(a)−) ∪ ⋃
a∈Ak
ps(ai)
+ Ak 6= ∅
sk−1 Ak = ∅
(4)
We now turn our attention to the properties of each sequence of actions.
Definition 9 (Goal Satisfaction). Goal requirements should hold in order to
satisfy the goal. A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · (an, tan)〉 satisfies
goal g if there is at least one state sk ∈ S(pi) that satisfies the goal:
pi |= r(g) iff ∃ sk ∈ S(pi) s.t. sk |= r(g) (5)
The set of goals satisfied by pi is denoted as Gpi:
Gpi = {g | pi |= r(g)} (6)
Definition 10 (Activated Norms). A norm n = 〈do, acon, asub, dl, c〉 is in-
stantiated in a sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 if its activation
condition acon belongs to the sequence of actions. Let Npi be the set of in-
stantiations of various norms in pi defined in Equation 7. Note that dlins is
calculated based on Definition 5.
Npi = {〈do, acon , asub , dl ins , c〉 | 〈do, acon, asub, dl, c〉 ∈ N, (acon, tacon) ∈̂ pi}
(7)
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Definition 11 (Obligation Compliance). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0),
· · · , (an, tan)〉 complies with an obligation n = 〈o, acon , asub , dl ins , c〉 if acon
is executed in pi and asub, starts (cf. Eq. 8) or starts and ends (cf. Eq. 9)
within the period when the condition holds and when the deadline expires:
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈̂ pi s.t. tasub ∈ [tacon + dacon , dl ins) (8)
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈̂ pi s.t.
[tasub , tasub + dasub ] ⊆ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (9)
Definition 12 (Obligation Violation). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0),
· · · , (an, tan)〉 violates obligation nins = 〈o, acon, asub, dlins, c〉 if acon is exe-
cuted in pi, but asub does not start (Equation 10), or does not start and end
(Equation 11) in the period between the state when the condition holds and
when the deadline expires.
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈̂ pi, (asub, tasub) ̂6∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (10)
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈̂ pi, (asub, tasub) ̂6∈ pi s.t.
[tasub , tasub + dasub ] ⊆ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (11)
Example 6. Let there be the following instantiated version
n′2 = 〈o, detectPoison, stopWater , 8, 10〉
of norm
n2 = 〈o, detectPoison, stopWater , 2, 10〉
from Example 3. The compliance period for this norm in displayed in the
figure below. According to Def. 11 in its Eq. 8, if tstopWater belongs to this
period, this norm instance is complied with; otherwise, according to Def. 12 in
its Eq. 10, the norm is violated. This is illustrated by the following diagram:
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detectPoison compliance period
Example 7. Let there be the following instantiated version
n′3 = 〈o, detectEarthquake, blockMainRoad , 7, 12〉
of norm
n3 = 〈o, detectEarthquake, blockMainRoad , 5, 12〉
which obliges the agent to have blocked the main road within 5 units of time af-
ter detecting an earthquake. Since the post-conditions of action blockMainRoad
are brought about at the end of its execution, according to Def. 11 (Eq. 9), this
norm is complied with if blockMainRoad starts and ends between time points
2 and 7. Otherwise, according to Def. 12 (Eq. 11) this norm is violated.
Definition 13 (Prohibition Compliance). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0),
· · · , (an, tan)〉 complies with prohibition n = 〈f, acon, asub, dlins, c〉 if acon, is
executed and asub, does not start (Eq. 12) or does not start and end (Eq. 13)
in the period when the condition holds and the deadline expires. Formally:
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈̂ pi, (asub, tasub) ̂6∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (12)
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈̂ pi, (asub, tasub) ̂6∈ pi s.t.
[tasub , tasub + dasub ] ⊆ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (13)
Definition 14 (Prohibition Violation). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0),
· · · , (an, tan)〉 violates prohibition n = 〈f, acon, asub, dlins, c〉 iff acon, has oc-
curred and asub starts (Eq. 14) or starts and ends (Eq. 15) in the period
between when the condition holds and when the deadline expires. Formally:
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈̂ pi s.t. tasub ∈ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (14)
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈̂ pi s.t.
[tasub , tasub + dasub ] ⊆ [tacon + dacon , dlins) (15)
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Example 8. Let there be the following instantiated version
n′1 = 〈f, detectShock , buildShelter , 6, 5〉
of norm
n1 = 〈f, detectShock , buildShelter , 3, 5〉
presented in Ex. 3. The compliance period for this norm in displayed in the
figure below. According to Def. 14 (Eq. 14), if tbuildShelter belongs to this pe-
riod, this norm instance is violated; otherwise, according to Def. 13 (Eq. 12),
it is complied with.
Example 9. Let there be the following instantiated version
n′4 = 〈f, detectEarthquake, blockMainRoad , 7, 12〉
of norm
n4 = 〈f, detectEarthquake, blockMainRoad , 5, 12〉
which forbids the agent from blocking the main road within 5 units of time af-
ter detecting an earthquake. Since the post-conditions of action blockMainRoad
are brought about at the end of its execution, according to Def. 13 (Eq. 13),
this norm is violated if blockMainRoad starts and ends between time points 2
and 7. Otherwise, according to Def. 14 (Eq. 15) this norm is complied with.
This is illustrated by the diagram below.
The set of norms complied with and violated in pi are denoted as Ncmp(pi)
and Nvol(pi) respectively, and defined as follows:
Ncmp(pi) = {nins ∈ Npi | pi |= nins} (16)
Nvol(pi) = {nins ∈ Npi | pi 6|= nins} (17)
To make sure there are no norms pending at m = Makespan(pi), we assume
that the norm deadlines are smaller than m. Therefore, all the activated
norms in pi are either complied with or violated by time m:
Npi = Ncmp(pi) ∪Nvol(pi) (18)
Alternatively, it could be assumed that the norms that are pending (i.e.
neither violated nor complied with) at m are all considered as complied with
or violated.
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3.6.2. Conflict
In the previous section we defined when a sequence of actions satisfies a
goal, complies with or violates a norm. A possible cause for not satisfying
a certain goal is the conflict between the goal and another goal or norm.
Likewise, violating a norm could help in reaching a goal or complying with
another norm. In this work we do not concern ourselves directly with de-
tecting or resolving conflicts, instead, we focus on the consequences of such
conflicts on the agent behaviour. To make this work self-contained, however,
we briefly review the causes of conflicts between goals, between norms and
between goals and norms. We leave for future work the provision of agents
with the capability to reason about the plans and consequently inferring the
conflict between goals, between norms and between goals and norms.
An agent may pursue multiple goals or desires at the same time and it
is likely that some of these goals conflict (van Riemsdijk et al., 2002; Nigam
and Leite, 2006; Pokahr et al., 2005; Thangarajah et al., 2003; van Riemsdijk
et al., 2009). Conflict between the agent’s goals or desires, especially for BDI
agents, has been addressed by several authors. Hulstijn and van der Torre
(2004) describe two goals as conflicting if achieving them requires taking
two conflicting actions, where conflicting actions are encoded using integrity
constraints. Rahwan and Amgoud (2006) on the other hand, define two
desires as conflicting if the sets of beliefs that supports the achievement of
desires are contradictory. Like Rahwan and Amgoud (2006), Broersen et al.
(2002) argue that for a set of goals not to be conflicting, a consistent mental
attitude (e.g. beliefs and norms) is required. Some (e.g., (Toniolo, 2013))
have adopted a static view on goal conflict, in which conflicting goals are
mutually-exclusive, hence impossible to satisfy in the same plan regardless
of the order or choice of actions in the plan. Limited and bounded resources
(e.g. time, budget, etc.) are debated as another cause of conflict between
goals (Thangarajah et al., 2002).
Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al. (2005) discuss conflict between goals and norms in
terms of goals being hindered by norms or vice-versa. The same applies to
the approach offered by Modgil and Luck (2008), suggesting a mechanism to
resolve the conflicts between desires and normative goals. In this approach,
norms are represented as system goals that may conflict with an agent’s goals
or desires. Social goals and individual goals do not need to conflict directly.
Instead, conflict arises from the reward or punishment of complying with or
violating a norm that may facilitate or hinder some of the agent’s individual
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goals. Shams et al. (2015) identify the conflict between norms and goals
as follows. When an obligation forces the agent to take an action that has
postconditions that are inconsistent with the requirements of a goal, they
may come into conflict. On the other hand, when an action is prohibited,
and the postconditions of that action contribute to a goal, they may conflict.
Conflict between norms have been studied in multi-agent systems (e.g.,
Vasconcelos et al. (2009)) as well as other domains such as legal reasoning
(e.g., (Sartor, 1992)). When faced with conflicting norms, the agent cannot
comply with both of them and hence one of the norms is violated. In terms
of action-based norms, Shams et al. (2015) define two obligations conflicting
if they oblige the agent to take two conflicting actions (cf. Def. 6) in an
overlapping time interval. Likewise, an obligation and a prohibition cause
conflict if they oblige and forbid the agent to execute the same action in an
overlapping time interval.
Having defined sequences of actions and the properties and conflicts they
can involve, we can now define which sequences of action can be identified
as plans in the next section.
3.6.3. Plans
In classical planning a sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tn)〉 is
identified as a plan if all the fluents in the initial state, do hold at time 0
and for each i, the preconditions of action ai hold at time tai , and the goal of
planning problem is satisfied in time m, where m = Makespan(pi). However,
extending the conventional planning problem by multiple potentially con-
flicting goals and norms requires defining extra conditions in order to make
a sequence of actions a plan and a solution for P . In what follows, we define
what is required to identify a sequence of actions as a plan.
Definition 15 (Plan). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), . . . , (an, tan)〉 s.t. @
(ai, tai), (aj, taj) ∈̂ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai + dai , (ai, aj) ∈ cf action is a plan for
the normative practical reasoning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) if the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
• fluents in ∆ (and only those fluents) hold in the initial state: s0 = ∆
• the preconditions of action ai holds at time tai and throughout the exe-
cution of ai: ∀k ∈ [tai , tai + dai), sk |= pr(ai)
• plan pi satisfies a non-empty subset of goals: Gpi 6= ∅
The utility of a plan pi is defined by deducting the penalty costs of violated
norms from the value gain of satisfying goals (Equation 19). The set of
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optimal plans, Opt , are those plans that maximise the utility.
Utility(pi) =
∑
gi∈Gpi
v(gi)−
∑
nj∈Nvol(pi)
c(nj) (19)
Examples of calculating the utility of plans are in Appendix B.
The set Opt is empty only if there are no plans for the planning prob-
lem. Otherwise, the utility function is guaranteed to terminate and find the
optimal plans and hence populate the set Opt.
4. Implementation
In this section, we demonstrate how a normative practical reasoning prob-
lem P = (FL,∆, A, G,N) (cf. Def. 1), can be implemented. Our implemen-
tation should be seen as a proof of concept that provides a computational re-
alisation of all aspects of the formal model. We use Answer Set Programming
(ASP) (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988) to propose such an implementation. Re-
cent work on planning in ASP (To et al., 2015) demonstrates that in terms
of general planners ASP is a viable competitor. The Event Calculus (EC)
(Kowalski and Sergot, 1986) forms the basis for the implementation of some
normative reasoning frameworks, such as those of Alrawagfeh and Meneguzzi
(2014) and Artikis et al. (2009). Our proposed formal model is independent
of language and could be translated to EC and hence to a computational
model. However, the one-step translation to an ASP is preferred because
the formulation of the problem is much closer to a computational model,
thus there is a much narrower conceptual gap to bridge. Furthermore, the
EC implementation language is Prolog, which although syntactically similar
to ASP, suffers from non-declarative features such as clause ordering affect-
ing the outcome and the cut (“!”) operator, jeopardising its completeness.
Also, its query-based nature which focuses on one query at a time, makes it
cumbersome to reason about all plans.
In what follows, we provide a brief introduction to ASP in Section 4.1,
followed by the mapping of normative practical reasoning problem P =
(FL,∆, A, G,N) (cf. Def. 1) into ASP in Section 4.2. In the latter sec-
tion we show how P is mapped into an answer set program such that there
is a one to one correspondence between solutions for the problem and the
answer sets of the program. The mapping itself is provided in Figure 2. The
explanation of the mapping is presented in Sections 4.2.1–4.2.6, with cross
references to the code fragments listed in Figure 2.
20
4.1. Answer Set Programming
ASP is a declarative programming paradigm using logic programs under
Answer Set semantics (Lifschitz, 2008). Like all declarative paradigms it has
the advantage of describing the constraints and the solutions rather than
the writing of an algorithm to find solutions to a problem. A variety of
programming languages for ASP exist, and we use AnsProlog (Baral, 2003).
There are several efficient solvers for AnsProlog, of which Clingo (Gebser
et al., 2011) and DLV (Eiter et al., 1999) are currently the most widely used.
The basic components of AnsProlog are atoms that are constructs to
which one can assign a truth value. An atom can be negated, adopting
negation as failure (naf), which establishes that a negated atom not a is true
if there is no evidence to prove a. Literals are atoms a or negated atoms
not a (referred to as naf-literals). Atoms and literals are used to create rules
of the general form “a :− b1, ..., bm, not c1, ..., not cn.” where a, bi and cj are
atoms. Intuitively, a rule means that if all atoms bi are known/true and no
atom cj is known/true, then a must be known/true. We refer to a as the
head of the rule and b1, ..., bm, not c1, ..., not cn as the body of the rule. A
rule with an empty body is called a fact and a rule with an empty head
is called a constraint, indicating that no solution should be able to satisfy
the body. Another type of rules are called choice rules and are denoted as
l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − l1, · · · , lm, not lm+1, · · · , not ln., in which his and lis are
atoms. l and u are integers and the default values for them are 0 and 1,
respectively. A choice rule is satisfied if the number of atoms belonging to
{h0, · · · , hk} that are true/known is between the lower bound l and upper
bound u. A program is a set of rules representing their conjunction. The
semantics of AnsProlog is defined in terms of answer sets, i.e. assignments of
true and false to all atoms in the program that satisfy the rules in a minimal
and consistent fashion. A program may have zero or more answer sets, each
corresponding to a solution. We refer to Appendix D and Baral (2003) for
a formal treatment of the semantics of ASP.
4.2. Translating the Normative Practical Reasoning Problem into ASP
Prior to describing the mapping (Figure 2) of normative practical reason-
ing problem P = (FL,∆, A, G,N) into ASP, we list the atoms that we use
in the mapping in Table 1. The description of the mapping is presented in
the following sections with references to Figure 2. Note that variables are in
capitals and grounded variables are in small italics.
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Table 1: Atoms and their Intended Meaning
Atom Intended meaning
state(S) S is a state
holdsat(F, S) fluent F holds in state S
terminated(F, S) fluent F terminates in state S
action(A, D) A is an action with duration D
executed(A, S) action A is executed in state S
pre(A, S) the preconditions of action A hold in state S
inprog(A, S) action A is in progress in state S
goal(G, V) G is a goal with value V
satisfied(G, S) goal G is satisfied in state S
norm(N, C) N is a norm with the violation cost of C
cmp(o|f(N, S1, A, DL), S2) the instantiated version of obligation or pro-
hibition N in state S1, is complied with in
state S2
vol(o|f(N, S1, A, DL), S2) the instantiated version of obligation or pro-
hibition N in state S1, is violated in state S2
value(TV) TV is the sum of values of goals satisfied in a plan
cost(TC) TC is the sum of violation costs of norms vi-
olated in a plan
utility(U) U is the utility of a plan as the difference of
values of goals satisfied and norms violated
in the plan
4.2.1. States
In Section 3.6 we described the semantics P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) over a
set of states. The facts produced by line 1 provide the program with all
available states for plans of maximum length q. Currently, the length of
the plans needs to be determined experimentally. We plan to automate this
using incremental features of ASP solver clingo4 (Gebser et al., 2011). Line
2 encodes that the initial fluents, (x ∈ ∆) need to hold at state 0 which is
achieved by the facts holdsat(x, 0). Fluents are inertial, they continue to
hold unless they are terminated. Inertia is encoded in lines 3–4. Termination
is modelled through the predicate terminated(X,S).
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4.2.2. Actions
This section describes the details of encoding of actions. Each durative
action is encoded as action(a, d) (line 5), where a is the name of the action
and d is its duration. The preconditions pr(a) of action a hold in state s
if s |= pr(a). This is expressed in line 6 using atom pre(a,S) In order to
make the coding more readable we introduce the shorthand EX(X,S), where
X is a set of fluents that should hold at state S. For all x ∈ X, EX(X,S) is
translated into holdsat(x,S) and for all ¬x ∈ X, EX(¬X,S) is translated
into not EX(x,S) using negation as failure.
The agent has the choice to execute any of its actions in any state. This
is expressed in the choice rule in line 7. Since no lower or upper bound
is given for {executed(A,S)}, the default value of 0{executed(A,S)}1 is
implied, meaning that the agent has the choice of whether or not to execute
an action. Following the approach in Blum and Furst (1997), we assume
that the preconditions of a durative action should be preserved when it is in
progress. We first encode the description of an action in progress, followed
by ruling out the possibility of an action being in progress in the absence of
its preconditions. A durative action is in progress, inprog(A,S), from the
state in which it starts up to the state in which it ends (lines 8–9). Line 10,
rules out the execution of an action, when the preconditions of the action
do not hold during its execution. A further assumption made is that the
agent cannot start two actions at exactly the same time (line 11–12). Once
an action starts, the result of its execution is reflected in the state where the
action ends. This is expressed through (i) lines 13–14 that allow the add
postconditions of the action to hold when the action ends, and (ii) line 15–16
that allow the termination of the delete postconditions. Termination takes
place in the state before the end state of the action: the reason for this is the
inertia of fluents that was expressed in lines 3–4. Thus delete post-conditions
of an action are terminated in the state before the end state of the action, so
that they will not hold in the following state, in which the action ends (i.e.
they are deleted from the state).
4.2.3. Goals and Norms
Line 17 encodes goal g with value v as a fact. Goal g is satisfied in state
s if s |= g. This is expressed in line 18, where g+ and g− are the positive and
negative literals in the set g.
For the norms we note that, following Definitions 11–14, compliance and
violation of a norm can be established based on the start state of action’s
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Creating states: ∀ k ∈ [0, q]
1 state(k).
Setting up the initial state: ∀ x ∈ ∆
2 holdsat(x, 0).
Rule for fluent inertia
3 holdsat(X,S2) :- holdsat(X,S1), not terminated(X,S1),
4 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+1.
Creating the actions and their preconditions: ∀a ∈ A, a = 〈pr, ps, d〉
5 action(a, d).
6 pre(a,S) :- EX(pr(a)+,S), not EX(pr(a)−,S), state(S).
Common constraints on action execution
7 {executed(A,S)} :- action(A,D), state(S).
8 inprog(A,S2) :- executed(A,S1), action(A,D),
9 state(S1), state(S2), S1 <=S2, S2<S1+D.
10 :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), state(S), not pre(A,S).
11 :- executed(A1,S), executed(A2,S), A1!=A2,
12 action(A1,D1), action(A2 ,D2), state(S).
Adding positive postconditions of actions: ps(a)+ = X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X·
13 holdsat(x,S2) :- executed(a,S1), action(a, d),
14 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+d.
Terminating negative post conditions of actions: ps(a)− = X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X·
15 terminated(x,S2) :- executed(a,S1), action(a, d),
16 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+d-1.
Creating the goals: ∀g ∈ G
17 goal(g, v).
18 satisfied(g,S) :- EX(g+,S), not EX(g−,S), state(S).
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Creating the norms: ∀n = 〈o|f, asub, acon, dl, c〉 ∈ N
19 norm(n, c).
∀n = 〈o, asub, acon, dl, c〉 ∈ N
20 holdsat(o(n,S1 ,asub, dl+S2),S2) :- executed(acon,S1),
21 action(acon, d), S2=S1+d,state(S1), state(S2).
22 cmp(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- holdsat(o(n,S1 ,a,DL),S2),
23 executed(a,S2),action(a, d),state(S1),state(S2),S2!=DL.
24 terminated(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- cmp(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2),
25 state(S1), state(S2).
26 vol(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- holdsat(o(n,S1 ,a,DL),S2), DL=S2 ,
27 state(S1), state(S2).
28 terminated(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- vol(o(n,S1,a,DL),S2),
29 state(S1), state(S2).
∀n = 〈f, asub, acon, dl, c〉 ∈ N
30 holdsat(f(n,S1 ,asub, dl+S2),S2) :- executed(acon,S1),
31 action(acon, d),S2=S1+d,state(S1), state(S2).
32 cmp(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- holdsat(f(n,S1 ,a,DL),S2),
33 action(a, d), DL=S2 , state(S1), state(S2).
34 terminated(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- cmp(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2),
35 state(S1), state(S2).
36 vol(f(n,S1,a,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2),
37 executed(a,S2),state(S1) state(S2), S2!=DL.
38 terminated(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2) :- vol(f(n,S1,a,DL),S2),
39 state(S1), state(S2).
Plans need to satisfy at least one goal
40 satisfied(g) :- satisfied(g,S), state(S).
41 :- not satisfied(g1), ... , not satisfied(gm).
Avoiding conflicting actions: ∀ (a1, a2) ∈ cf action
42 :- inprog(a1,S),inprog(a2,S),action(a1, d1), action(a2, d2),
43 state(S).
Figure 2: Mapping P = (FL, I, A,G,N) to its Corresponding Computational Model
ΠPBase
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execution that is the subject of the norm, or at the end state of action’s
execution. In the encoding we show an implementation of the former; the
latter can be catered for in a similar fashion.
Lines 19–39 deal with obligations and prohibitions of the form n =
〈d o, acon , asub , dl , c〉. Line 19 encodes norm n with penalty cost c upon vio-
lation. In order to implement the concepts of norm compliance and violation
for instantiated norms, we introduce a normative fluent that holds over the
compliance period. The compliance period begins from the state in which
action acon ’s execution ends. The compliance period then ends within dl
time units of the end of action acon , which is denoted as dl
′ in the normative
fluent. For instance, fluent o(n1, s
′, asub , dl
′) expresses that the instance of
norm n1 that was activated in state s
′, obliges the agent to execute action
asub before deadline dl
′. The state in which the norm is activated is a part
of the fluent to distinguish different activations of the same norm from one
another. For example, fluent o(n1, s
′′, asub , dl
′′) refers to a different instance
of norm n1 that was activated in s′′. An obligation fluent denotes that action
asub ’s execution should begin before deadline dl
′ or be subject to violation,
while prohibition fluent f(n2, s
′, asub , dl
′) denotes that action asub should not
begin before deadline dl ′ or be subject to violation. Lines 20–21 and 30–31
establish respectively the obligation and prohibition fluents that hold for the
duration of the compliance period.
In terms of compliance, if the obliged action starts during the compliance
period in which the obligation fluent holds, the obligation is complied with
(line 22–23). Compliance is denoted by the atom cmp. The obligation fluent
is terminated in the same state that compliance is detected (lines 24–25).
If the deadline expires and the obligation fluent still holds, it means that
the compliance never occurred during the compliance period and the norm
is therefore violated (lines 26–27). The atom vol denotes violation. The
obligation fluent is terminated when the deadline expires and the norm is
violated (lines 28–29).
On the other hand, a prohibition norm is violated if the forbidden action
begins during the compliance period in which the prohibition fluent holds
(lines 36–37). As with the obligation norms, after being violated, the pro-
hibition fluent is terminated (lines 38–39). If the deadline expires and the
prohibition fluent still holds, that means the prohibited action did not begin
during the compliance period and the norm is therefore complied with (lines
32–33). The obligation fluent is terminated in the same state that compliance
is detected (lines 34–35).
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4.2.4. Mapping Answer Sets to Plans
Having implemented the components of P = (FL,∆, A,G,N), we now
encode the criteria for a sequence of actions to be identified as a plan and
a solution to P . The rule in line 41 is responsible for constraining the an-
swer sets to those that fulfill at least one goal. This is done by excluding
answers that do not satisfy any goal. The input for this rule is provided in
line 40, where goals are marked as satisfied if they are satisfied in at least
one state. Prevention of concurrent conflicting actions is achieved via lines
42–43 which establish that two such actions cannot be in progress simulta-
neously. This concludes the mapping of a formal planning problem to its
computational counterpart in AnsProlog. For a problem P we refer to the
program consisting of lines 1–43 as ΠPBase .
As mentioned in Section 2, the formulation of our Disaster scenario is
provided in Appendix A. The mapping of the scenario to its computational
model follows in Appendix B.
4.2.5. Soundness and Completeness of Implementation
The following theorems state the correspondence between the solutions
for problem P and answer sets of program ΠPBase.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let P = (FL, I, A,G,N) be a normative prac-
tical reasoning problem with ΠPBase as its corresponding AnsProlog pro-
gram. Let Ans be an answer set of ΠPBase, then a set of atoms of the form
executed(ai, tai) ∈ Ans encodes a solution to P .
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix C. This is a proof by
structure that explains how the structure of ΠPBase satisfies the conditions
that identifies a sequence of actions as a plan.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 be a plan for
P = (FL, I, A,G,N). Then there exists an answer set of ΠPBase containing
atoms executed(ai, tai) that correspond to pi.
The proof of this theorem is presented in Appendix D. In this proof the
program is first transformed to a program without any naf-literals and choice
rules. We then take a candidate answer set for the program and show that
it is a minimal model for the transformed program.
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44 value(TV) :- TV = #sum {V: goal(G,V), satisfied(G)}.
45 violated(N,S1) :- vol(o(N,S1,a,DL),S2), state(S1;S2).
46 violated(N,S1) :- vol(f(N,S1,a,DL),S2), state(S1;S2).
47 cost(TC) :- TC = #sum{C,S:violated(N,S),norm(N,C)}.
48 utility(TV -TC) :- value(TV), cost(TC).
49 #maximize {U:utility(U)}.
Figure 3: Optimal Plans for P = (FL, I, A,G,N)
4.2.6. Optimal Plans
In order to find optimal plans in Figure 3 we show how to encode the
utility function defined by Eq. 19. The sum of values of goals satisfied in a
plan is calculated in line 44, where we use an ASP built-in aggregate #sum.
This aggregate is an operation on a set of weighted literals that evaluates to
the sum of the weights of the literals. We first assign the value of goals as
the weight of literals satisfied(G) and then use #sum to compute the sum
of value of all goals satisfied.
The sum of costs of norms violated in a plan is calculated in line 47
using the same aggregate. However, the weight of the literal is the cost
of punishment of the norms. The input for this line is given in lines 45
and 46, where violated norms are distinguished based on the combination
of the norm id n and the state s in which they are instantiated. Having
calculated value(TV) and cost(TC), the utility of a plan is computed in line
48, which is subject to a built-in optimisation statement in the final line.
This optimisation statement identifies an answer set as optimal if the sum of
weights of literals that hold is maximal with respect to all answer sets of the
program. By assigning U as the weight of literal utility(U) we compute the
answer set that maximises the utility.
Let program ΠP = ΠPBase ∪ Π∗P , where Π∗P consists of lines 44–49. The
following theorem states the correspondence between the plans for problem
P and answer sets of program ΠP .
Theorem 3. Given a normative practical reasoning problem P = (FL, I, A,
G,N), for each answer set Ans of Π the set of atoms of the form executed(ai,
tai) in Ans encodes an optimal solution to P . Conversely, each solution to
the problem P corresponds to a single answer set of pi.
This theorem follows immediately from Theorem 1 and 2 and the struc-
ture of program Π∗P .
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5. Related Work
In this section we first review a number of architectures aimed at incor-
porating normative reasoning into practical reasoning which we group into
BDI (Section 5.1) and non-BDI (Section 5.2). Then in Section 5.3 we exam-
ine different classifications of these architectures according to the approaches
taken. In the same section we also compare these approaches with the ap-
proach proposed here.
5.1. BDI Architectures with Normative Reasoning
There is a substantial body of work on the integration of norms into
the BDI architecture (Rao and Georgeff, 1995), but motivation, theory and
practice vary substantially. A key assumption here is that a plan library (i.e.
a set of pre-defined plans) exists and the agent uses normative considerations
to choose and/or customise a provided plan, rather than generating a norm-
compliant plan. We review several normative BDI frameworks and compare
them with the approach proposed here.
The BOID architecture (Broersen et al., 2001) extends BDI with the con-
cept of obligation and uses agent types such as social, selfish, etc. to handle
the conflicts between beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations. For example,
selfish agents give priority to their desires in case of conflict, whereas social
agents give priority to their obligations. Since beliefs, desires, intentions and
obligations are all represented as a set of rules, priorities are assigned to rules
and subsequently used to resolve the conflict. BOID’s rich rule-based lan-
guage makes for a very expressive system, but it is now of largely historical
interest, since the implementation is complicated – no reference version is
currently available – and has a high computational complexity.
NoA (Kollingbaum, 2005) is a normative language and agent architecture.
As a language it specifies the normative concepts of obligation, prohibition
and permission to regulate a specific type of agent interaction called “super-
vised interaction”. As a practical reasoning agent architecture, it describes
how agents select a plan from a pre-generated plan library such that the
norms imposed on the agent at each point of time are observed. NoA agents
do not have internal motivations such as goals or values that might conflict
with norms, therefore the agent will always be norm compliant. Publications
on NoA do not discuss its evaluation and validate the implementation using
examples, which makes the status of the implementation unclear.
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ν-BDI (Meneguzzi et al., 2015) enables BDI agents to perform normative
reasoning for the purpose of customising pre-existing plans that ensure com-
pliance with the set of norms imposed on the agent. That said, there are
mechanisms in place to allow norm violation where goal achievement would
not otherwise be possible. In contrast to BOID and NoA, much attention is
paid to the practicality and computational efficiency of reasoning in ν-BDI.
This is evidenced by the complexity analysis of the algorithms for the norm
management mechanism, complemented by empirical analysis, and which
both report reasonable (sic) computational costs.
N-2APL (Alechina et al., 2012) is a norm-aware agent programming lan-
guage based on 2APL (Dastani, 2008) that supports representation of and
reasoning about beliefs, goals, plans, norms, sanctions and deadlines. The
N-2APL agents select plans to execute such that they fulfill obligations im-
posed on agents. The agent can also choose to suppress certain plans to avoid
violating prohibitions. Scheduling of plans is conducted based on plan dead-
lines or possible sanctions associated with the plans. The scheduling does
not concern itself with construction of interleaving plans, thus scheduling
boils down to sequencing of plans. Norms in N-2APL are quite simple, being
either obligations to carry out and prohibitions not to carry out a specified
action. The norms are not conditional (i.e. there is no activation condition
defined that triggers the norm) and unlike obligations the prohibitions do
not have deadlines.
N-Jason (Lee et al., 2014) sets out an extension of the Jason (Bordini
et al., 2007) variant of the BDI architecture to account for norms in plan
selection and to handle priorities in plan scheduling. Like N-2APL, N-Jason
enables the underlying implementation of the BDI architecture to carry out
norm-aware deliberation and provides a run-time norm execution mechanism,
through which new unknown norms – as long as they pertain to known
actions – are recognized and can trigger plans. To be able to process a norm
such as an obligation, which includes a deadline, the agent architecture must
be able to reason about deadlines and priorities, and choose between plans
triggered by a particular norm. Consequently, N-Jason extends the syntax of
the plan library to allow priority annotation, and the scheduling algorithm
of AgentSpeak(RT) to operate in the context of Jason/AgentSpeak(L) and
provide “real-time agency”.
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5.2. Non-BDI Architectures with Normative Reasoning
A second smaller group of research work considers the problem either
from a non-BDI perspective or are agent-architecture agnostic. One result
of not being tied to BDI is not necessarily relying on a pre-generated plan
library, which raises issues of how to generate norm-compliant plans.
Oren et al. (2011) do utilise a pre-generated plan, like the list above, but
take norms into consideration when deciding how to execute the plan with
respect to the norms triggered by that plan. Specifically, the approach aims
to adjust the chosen plan to account for the norms that govern the plan
actions at each point in time, where the norm expresses constraints on the
values that can be assigned to variables in a plan action. The adjustments of
values in actions specify how the agent should execute a plan, such that the
cost of violated norms is outweighed by the reward from norm compliance.
The most preferred plan is therefore the one that maximises this metric.
Panagiotidi et al. (2012a) take norms into account in plan generation
where the planning problem is specified in PDDL 2.1 (Fox and Long, 2003).
The normative state of the agent is checked, using the planning tool Metric-
FF (Hoffmann and Nebel, 2001), after each individual action; then the plan-
ner decides if the agent should comply with a norm or not based on a linear
cost function specified in terms of constraints on the states achieved during
each plan. Although this mechanism enables an agent to cope with the dy-
namics of operating in an open environment, checking the normative position
of an agent after each action imposes a high computational cost on the plan
generation phase.
Shams et al. (2015) define an approach to practical reasoning that con-
siders norms in both plan generation and plan selection. The agent attempts
to satisfy a set of potentially conflicting goals in the presence of norms, as
opposed to conventional planning problems that generate plans for a single
goal. The main contributions of Shams et al. (2015) are (i) the introduc-
tion of an enforcement approach that is a combination of utility-based and
pressure-based compliance methods (Lo´pez y Lo´pez et al., 2005), and (ii) for-
malising the conflicts between goals, between norms, and between goals and
norms. There is a penalty cost for norm violation regardless of the existence
of conflict. Whenever a norm is triggered, outcomes of norm compliance and
violation, and their impacts on the hinderance or facilitation of other goals
and norms, are both generated and compared by utility. In those cases where
there are no conflicts and no goals or norms are hindered by the punishment
of violation, the loss of utility drives the agent towards compliance. Plans
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are selected based on the comparison of the utility of the goals satisfied and
cost of norms violated in the entire plan.
5.3. Normative Reasoning Mechanisms
We now consider the approaches accounting for norms in practical rea-
soning in order to uncover similarities across architectures. Not surprisingly,
much work stems from planning and how to take account of norms in the plan
identification or construction process. There are broadly three approaches:
1. Choosing a plan that is norm compliant (e.g., NoA (Kollingbaum,
2005)), which is a one-off process, that may fail delivering the best
(where “best” can be defined in various ways) plan available for the
situation from those available, and which requires starting again when
a plan step fails and the remainder of the plan is invalidated. The
main points of difference between NoA and the work presented here
are that (i) NoA agents are BDI specific, (ii) they do not have inter-
nal motivations such as goals or values that might conflict with norms,
which therefore enables the NoA agent to always comply with norms
(iii) plans are pre-existing rather than generated.
2. Customising a plan to make it norm compliant (e.g., (Oren et al., 2011))
is potentially more flexible in making use of available plans (also help-
ing customize existing plans into optimal norm-compliant plans), but
otherwise has the same replanning drawback. In common with Oren
et al. (2011), we use the utility of the entire plan in the selection pro-
cess, but differ in that we generate plans rather than use plans from a
library.
3. Generating a plan that is norm compliant (e.g., (Panagiotidi et al.,
2012a; Shams et al., 2015)). The former addresses on-going compli-
ance and re-planning, putting a high computational overhead on each
plan step. Of necessity, Panagiotidi et al. (2012a) can only compute
utility on a step-by-step basis, whereas we consider the utility of the
whole plan. Shams et al. (2015) attempt to balance compliance on the
part of the agent (where the agent chooses a norm-compliant action
in preference) with enforcement (where the agent is discouraged from
non-norm-compliance via punishments for norm violation), but is not
robust to plan failure. Furthermore, in Shams et al. (2015), conflict
is formulated in advance by taking a static view about conflicts. For
instance, two goals that are logically inconsistent, cannot be satisfied
in the same plan, regardless of the order or choice of actions in a plan.
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Table 2: Summary of Related Frameworks
Framework Deontic Operator Activation Condition De-activation Condition
BOID (Broersen et al., 2001) o N/A N/A
NoA (Kollingbaum, 2005) o, f, p state, action state, action
ν-BDI (Meneguzzi et al., 2015) o, f state state
N-2APL (Alechina et al., 2012) o, f state state3
N-Jason (Lee et al., 2014) o, p, w4 N/A temporal constraint
Oren et al. (2011) o, f N/A N/A
Panagiotidi et al. (2012a) o, f state state
Shams et al. (2015) o, f action temporal constraint
This work o, f action temporal constraint
In contrast, in the work presented here, conflicts are not formulated in
advance; instead, they are inferred from plans. Therefore, the agent
might be able to schedule its actions such that two goals that are log-
ically inconsistent are satisfied in the same plan at different points in
time. As discussed in Section 3.6, the norm representation is extended
to accommodate compliance and violation in the presence of durative
actions more flexibly by allowing compliance to be defined as the start
or end of the action that is the subject of the norm.
Table 2 shows a summary of related framework to the framework pro-
posed in this paper. For the current work, the parameters compared are
the same as Shams et al. (2015). The majority of frameworks, including
our framework, deal with obligations and prohibitions. Activation condition,
however, varies in those that do support conditional norms. An activation
condition presented as an action can be expressed as a state that satisfies
the post-conditions of the action. Unlike many related frameworks, we have
exploited the explicit representation of time in formal model to encode the
norm de-activation condition as a time instant. As discussed in Section 3.5,
associating a deadline with temporal properties is considered to be realistic
and dynamic, in particular when the norms capture the requirements of real-
world scenarios (Chesani et al., 2013; Kafali et al., 2014; Gasparini et al.,
2015), such as the disaster scenario we have modelled in this paper. An-
other important differentiation point between our work and the related ones
3The de-activation condition only applies to obligations. Prohibitions do not have such
a condition.
4Operator w stands for power and indicates the capability of doing something in pro-
hibitive societies, where actions are not allowed unless empowered and explicitly permitted.
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is that our model is capable of handling durative actions and their execution
concurrently, as well as dealing with norm compliance and violation in the
presence of durative actions.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
An agent performing practical reasoning in an environment regulated by
norms constantly needs to weigh up the importance of goals to be satisfied
and norms with which to comply. This decision process is only possible when
the agent has access to the set of all possible plans available and the agent can
ascertain the impact of its decision on entire plans. This research offers means
to capture and measure the impact via utility functions, offering numeric
metrics, so that the decision problem can be reformulated as choosing a plan
from a set of generated plans, which maximises its overall utility. While
the literature we have surveyed contains practical reasoning frameworks that
take into account normative considerations, they are limited in several ways,
and we have contrasted them with our approach in this article.
The majority of these frameworks are limited to a specific type of agent
architecture, mostly BDI, (e.g., (Broersen et al., 2001; Kollingbaum, 2005;
Meneguzzi et al., 2015)). In our research we do not assume any specific ar-
chitecture. Instead, we adopt a realistic view that agents have capabilities
(encoded as the actions they may perform), and they have internal motiva-
tions (encoded as the goals of a planning problem). This leaves the option
of extending current work to a multi-agent setting where agents might not
necessarily have the same architecture.
In the approaches set out in the literature the attitude agents have to-
wards norms is often one of compliance, meaning that their plans are often
selected or, in some approaches, customised, to ensure norm compliance,
(e.g., (Kollingbaum, 2005; Alechina et al., 2012; Oren et al., 2011)). We ar-
gue that in certain situations an agent might be better off violating a norm
which, if followed, would make it impossible for the agent to achieve an im-
portant goal or complying with a more important norm; we enable agents
to compare the relative importance of goals and norms via their utilities.
Consequently, through our practical reasoning process agents consider all
plans (i.e., sequences of actions), including those leading to norm compliance
and violation; each plan gets an associated overall utility for its sequences of
actions, and norms followed/violated, and agents can decide which of them
to pursue. The plan an agent chooses to follow is not necessarily norm-
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compliant, however, our mechanism guarantees that the decision will max-
imise the overall plan/norm utility, which justifies the occasional violation of
norms as the plan is followed.
We see several interesting avenues for future work. Our research currently
addresses normative practical reasoning in a single-agent setting, extending
to a multi-agent setting seems a natural next step. This idea can be explored
both when the agents are collaborating to fulfill common goals, as well as
when they are competing to use resources to fulfill their individual goals.
In the former case, the best course of action can be identified as one that
maximises the overall utility of the system. In the latter, game-theoretic
approaches can be utilised to identify a solution that ensure relative opti-
mality for the individuals (e.g. A˚gotnes et al. (2007)). Another possibility to
explore in a multi-agent setting is to infer conflicts between goals, between
norms and between goals and norms by analysing the overall set of possible
plans. The inferred conflicts can guide the process of re-engineering of the
system toward a more social and norm compliant system (e.g. (Savarimuthu
et al., 2013)).
We note the relative limitations of our norm representation. Although
our approach addressed action-based norms, we envisage how it can be ex-
tended and adapted to handle state-based norms. Our Def. 4 needs to cater
for formulae to represent both the norm activation condition, acon, and the
norm subject, asub, instead of actions. A combination of action- and state-
based norms (e.g. De Vos et al. (2013)) enriches the norm representation
as well as normative reasoning. Also, the norm representation language can
be extended to cater for deadlines that are expressed as reaching a state5
rather than a time instance. For instance, an obligation to open a dam on
a river can come in force when the water level is above a certain point, and
subsequently terminated when the water level drops below a certain level,
regardless of how long it takes for that to happen. We would also like to
include permission norms in addition to obligations and prohibitions. The
modelling of permissions as exceptions to obligations and prohibitions has
been used to justify violations under specific circumstances, (e.g. Oren et al.
(2010); Criado (2012)). It is also used as a means to handle the uncertainty
and incompleteness of the knowledge of the environment the agents operate
in (Alrawagfeh and Meneguzzi, 2014).
5In such cases the deadline is referred to as a norm termination condition.
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Finally, our implementation should be seen as a proof-of-concept that,
apart from replanning, provides a provable computational realisation of all
aspects of the formal model. In future, we aim at extending the implemen-
tation to accommodate replanning when a plan in progress is interrupted for
any reason. The formal model is implementation language neutral so other
implementation languages could be used.
Appendix A. Formulation of the Disaster Scenario
We provide a formalisation of the scenario set out in Section 2. Let
P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) be the normative practical reasoning problem for the
disaster scenario such that:
• FL =

shockDetected , poisonDetected ,waterSupplied ,
areaSecured , evacuated , shockDetected ,
shelterBuilt , populated ,wounded ,
earthquakeDetected ,medicineSupplied ,
noAccess ,medicsPresent

• ∆ =
{
earthquakeDetected ,medicsPresent ,
wounded , populated ,waterSupplied
}
• A =
{
detectShock , detectPoison, stopWater ,
buildShelter , evacuate, getMedicine, secure
}
where
detectShock = 〈{}, {shockDetected}, 1〉.
detectPoison = 〈{}, {poisonDetected}, 1〉.
stopWater =
〈{
poisonDetected ,
waterSupplied
}
, {¬waterSupplied}, 1
〉
buildShelter =
〈
areaSecured ,
evacuated ,
¬shockDetected
 ,
{
shelterBuilt ,
¬evacuated
}
, 4
〉
evacuate =
〈{
shockDetected ,
populated
}
,
{
evacuated ,
¬populated
}
, 5
〉
getMedicine =
〈{
earthquakeDetected ,
wounded
}
, {medicine}, 3
〉
secure =
〈
{evacuated},
{
areaSecured ,
noAccess
}
, 3
〉
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• G = {runningHospital , organiseSurvivorCamp}, where:
runningHospital =
〈
medicsPresent ,
waterSupplied ,
medicineSupplied
 , 25
〉
organiseSurvivorCamp =
〈{
areaSecured ,
shelterBuilt
}
, 18
〉
• N = {n1, n2}, where:
n1 = 〈f, detectShock , buildShelter , 3, 5〉
n2 = 〈o, detectPoison, stopWater , 2, 10〉
Appendix B. Mapping of Our Disaster Scenario
The formal specification of our disaster scenario (Section2) as provided in
the previous section can be mapped to its corresponding AnsProlog program
following the rules given in Figure 2 on page 25. The corresponding program
is shown in Figures B.4-B.8. Optimisation conditions are shown in Figure
B.9. The visualisation of the three answer sets of the program is displayed
in figures B.10–B.12, where arcs show the actions in progress and the boxes
below each state, show the fluents that hold in that state. The fluents in bold
are the fluents that are added to the state, while the crossed fluents are the
terminated ones. Norms violated in a state are highlighted in red and goals
satisfied are highlighted in green. Applying the optimisation statements in
Figure B.9, the utility of each plan presented by each answer set is calculated
as below, making the plan presented by answer set 3 the optimal plan.
Utility of plan presented by answer set 1, Figure B.10:
Utility(piAns1) = v(runningHospital) = 25
Utility of plan presented by answer set 2, Figure B.11:
Utility(piAns2) = v(runningHospital) + v(organiseSurvivorCamp) −
c(n1)− c(n1) = 25 + 18− 5− 5 = 33
Utility of plan presented by answer set 3, Figure B.12:
Utility(piAns3) = v(runningHospital) + v(organiseSurvivorCamp) =
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1 %Rules for states
2
3 state (0..13).
4 holdsat(earthquakeDetected ,0).
5 holdsat(medicsPresent ,0).
6 holdsat(wounded ,0).
7 holdsat(populated ,0).
8 holdsat(waterSupplied ,0).
9
10 %Inertial fluents
11
12 holdsat(X,S2) :- holdsat(X,S1), not terminated(X,S1),
13 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+1.
14
15 %Rules for Translating Actions
16
17 action(detectShock ,1).
18 pre(detectShock ,S) :- state(S).
19 holdsat(shockDetected ,S2) :-
20 executed(detectShock ,S1), action(detectShock ,1),
21 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+1.
22
23 action(detectPoison ,1).
24 pre(detectPoison ,S) :- state(S).
25 holdsat(poisonDetected ,S2) :-
26 executed(detectPoison ,S1),
27 action(detectPoison ,1), state(S1),
28 state(S2), S2=S1+1.
29
30 action(stopWater ,1).
31 pre(stopWater ,S) :- holdsat(poisonDetected ,S),
32 holdsat(waterSupplied ,S),state(S).
33 terminated(waterSupplied ,S2) :-
34 executed(stopWater ,S1), action(stopWater ,1),
35 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1.
Figure B.4: The Corresponding AnsProlog of The Disaster Scenario Part 1
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36 action(buildShelter ,4).
37 pre(buildShelter ,S) :- holdsat(areaSecured ,S),
38 holdsat(evacuated ,S), state(S).
39 holdsat(shelterBuilt ,S2) :-
40 executed(buildShelter ,S1), action(buildShelter ,4),
41 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+4.
42 terminated(evacuated ,S2) :-
43 executed(buildShelter ,S1), action(buildShelter ,4),
44 state(S1), state(S2),S2=S1+3.
45
46 action(evacuate ,5).
47 pre(evacuate ,S) :- holdsat(populated ,S),
48 holdsat(shockDetected ,S),state(S).
49 holdsat(evacuated ,S2) :- executed(evacuate ,S1),
50 action(evacuate ,5), state(S1), state(S2),
51 S2=S1+5.
52 terminated(populated ,S2) :- executed(evacuate ,S1),
53 action(evacuate ,5), state(S1), state(S2),
54 S2=S1+4.
55
56 action(getMedicine ,3).
57 pre(getMedicine ,S) :-
58 holdsat(earthquakeDetected ,S),
59 holdsat(wounded ,S),state(S).
60 holdsat(medicineSupplied ,S2) :-
61 executed(getMedicine ,S1),
62 action(getMedicine ,3),
63 state(S1), state(S2), S2=S1+3.
64
65 action(secure ,3).
66 pre(secure ,S) :- holdsat(evacuated ,S),state(S).
67 holdsat(areaSecured ,S2) :- executed(secure ,S1),
68 action(secure ,3), state(S1), state(S2),
69 S2=S1+3.
70 holdsat(noAccess ,S2) :- executed(secure ,S1),
71 action(secure ,3), state(S1), state(S2),
72 S2=S1+3.
Figure B.5: The Corresponding AnsProlog of The Disaster Scenario Part 2
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73 {executed(A,S)} :- action(A,D), state(S).
74 inprog(A,S2) :- executed(A,S1), action(A,D),
75 state(S1), state(S2), S1 <= S2, S2< S1+D.
76 :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), not pre(A,S), state(S).
77
78 % This rule ensures that not more than one action can
79 % be executed per state.
80 :- executed(A1,S), executed(A2,S), A1!=A2,
81 action(A1 ,D1), action(A2 ,D2), state(S).
82
83 % These rules ensure that there is no action executed
84 % or is in progress in the final state.
85 :- executed(A,13), action(A,D).
86 :- inprog(A,13), action(A,D).
87
88 % This rule ensures that the agent is not
89 % idle at any point.
90 alpha(S) :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), state(S).
91 :- not alpha(S), state(S), S<13.
92
93 %Rules for Translating Norms
94
95 norm(n1 ,5).
96 norm(n2 ,10).
97
98 holdsat(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,3+S2),S2) :-
99 executed(detectShock ,S1),
100 action(detectShock ,1),
101 S2=S1+1, state(S1), state(S2).
102 cmp(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2) :-
103 holdsat(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2),
104 action(buildShelter ,4), DL=S2 ,
105 state(S1), state(S2).
106 terminated(f(n1,S1,buildShelter ,DL),S2) :-
107 cmp(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2),
108 state(S1), state(S2).
Figure B.6: The Corresponding AnsProlog of The Disaster Scenario Part 3
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109 vol(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2) :-
110 holdsat(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2),
111 executed(buildShelter ,S2),state(S1),
112 state(S2), S2!=DL.
113 terminated(f(n1,S1,buildShelter ,DL),S2) :-
114 vol(f(n1 ,S1 ,buildShelter ,DL),S2),
115 state(S1), state(S2).
116
117 holdsat(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,2+S2),S2) :-
118 executed(detectPoison ,S1),
119 action(detectPoison ,1), S2=S1+1,
120 state(S1), state(S2).
121 cmp(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2) :-
122 holdsat(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2),
123 executed(stopWater ,S2),
124 action(stopWater ,1), state(S1),
125 state(S2), S2!=DL.
126 terminated(o(n2,S1,stopWater ,DL),S2) :-
127 cmp(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2), state(S1),
128 state(S2).
129 vol(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2) :-
130 holdsat(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2), DL=S2 ,
131 state(S1), state(S2).
132 terminated(o(n2,S1,stopWater ,DL),S2) :-
133 vol(o(n2 ,S1 ,stopWater ,DL),S2), state(S1),
134 state(S2).
135
136 % Generating Solution for problem P
137
138 goal(runningHospital ,25).
139 satisfied(runningHospital ,S) :-
140 holdsat(medicsPresent ,S),holdsat(waterSupplied ,S),
141 holdsat(medicineSupplied ,S), state(S).
142 satisfied(runningHospital) :-
143 satisfied(runningHospital ,S), state(S).
Figure B.7: The Corresponding AnsProlog of The Disaster Scenario Part 4
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145 goal(organiseSurvivorCamp ,18).
146 satisfied(organiseSurvivorCamp ,S) :-
147 holdsat(areaSecured ,S),
148 holdsat(shelterBuilt ,S), state(S).
149 satisfied(organiseSurvivorCamp) :-
150 satisfied(organiseSurvivorCamp ,S), state(S).
151
152 :- not satisfied(runningHospital),
153 not satisfied(organiseSurvivorCamp ).
154
155 :- inprog(detectShock ,S), inprog(buildShelter ,S),
156 action(detectShock ,1), action(buildShelter ,4),
157 state(S).
158
159 :- inprog(buildShelter ,S), inprog(evacuate ,S),
160 action(buildShelter ,4), action(evacuate ,5),
161 state(S).
162
163 :- inprog(buildShelter ,S), inprog(secure ,S),
164 action(buildShelter ,4), action(secure ,3), state(S).
Figure B.8: The Corresponding AnsProlog of The Disaster Scenario Part 5
1 violated(n1,S1) :- vol(f(n1,S1,buildShelter ,DL),S2),
2 state(S1), state(S2).
3 violated(n2,S1) :- vol(o(n2,S1,stopWater ,DL),S2),
4 state(S1), state(S2).
5
6 %Optimisation rules
7
8 value(TV) :- TV = #sum{V: goal(G,V),satisfied(G)}.
9 cost(TC) :- TC = #sum{C,S:violated(N,S),norm(N,C)}.
10
11 utility(TV -TC) :- value(TV),cost(TC).
12
13 #maximize{U:utility(U)}.
Figure B.9: Optimisation Rules for The Disaster Scenario
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Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem (Soundness). Let P = (FL, I, A,G,N) be a normative practical
reasoning problem with ΠPBase as its corresponding AnsProlog program. Let
Ans be an answer set of ΠPBase, then a set of atoms of the form executed(ai,
tai) ∈ Ans encodes a solution to P .
Proof. We need to prove that program ΠPBase (Figure 2) generates all se-
quences of actions that meet the criteria that identifies a sequence of actions
as a plan, as defined in Definition 15. This implies that the sequence of ac-
tions that is a part of the answer set satisfies all the criteria to be a solution
to the encoded planning program.
Actions and more precisely the postconditions of actions are what cause
the change from one state to another one. Line 7 generates all sequences of
actions. Lines 13–14 changes a state in which some actions end by adding
the add postconditions of those actions to the state. In contrast, Lines 15
and 16 terminate the delete postconditions of actions ending in the next
state such that those postconditions do not hold in the following state. If
there is no action ending in a state, the state remains unchanged as all
the fluents are inertial and they hold in the next state unless they are ter-
minated (Line 4). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), . . . , (an, tan)〉 s.t. @
(ai, tai), (aj, taj) ∈̂ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai + dai , (ai, aj) ∈ cf action is a plan
for the normative planning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) if the following
conditions hold:
• fluents in ∆ (and only those fluents) hold in the initial state: s0 = ∆.
Line 2 ensures that all fluents in ∆ are added to the initial state s0.
• the preconditions of action ai hold at time tai and throughout the ex-
ecution of ai: ∀k ∈ [tai , tai + dai), sk |= pr(ai).
Lines 10 guarantees that the preconditions of an action hold all through
its execution.
• plan pi satisfies a non-empty subset of goals: Gpi 6= ∅.
Line 41 indicates that a non-empty subset of goals has to be satisfied
in a plan.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem (Completeness). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 be a plan for P =
(FL, I, A,G,N). Then, there exists an answer set of ΠPBase containing atoms
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executed(ai, tai) that corresponds to pi.
For the sake of making this proof self-contained, we first provide a formal
definition of an answer set and explain the concept of reduct. As mentioned
previously, a number of syntactic language representations for ASP exist. We
use AnsProlog which is one of the most common classes of these languages.
and it has the following elements (Baral, 2003):
Term: A term is a constant or a variable or a n-ary function f(t1, · · · , tn),
where f is the function symbol and t1, · · · , tn are terms. Constants
start with a lower-case letter, whereas variables start with an upper-
case level. A term is ground if no variable occurs in it.
Atom: Atoms are the basic components of the language that can be as-
signed a truth value as true or false. An atom is a statement of form
A(t1, · · · , tn), where A is a predicate symbol and t1, · · · , tn are terms.
Literal: Literals are atoms or negated atoms. Atoms are negated using nega-
tion as failure (not). not a is true if there is no evidence proving the
truth of a. An atom preceded by not is referred to as a naf-literal.
The Herbrand universe of language L denoted as HUL is the set of all
ground terms which can be formed with the functions and constants in L.
The set of all ground atoms which can be formed with the functions, constants
and predicates in L is called Herbrand base of language L and is denoted
using HBL.
In Section 4.1, we explained that an AnsProlog program (e.g. Π) consists
of a finite set of rules. In order to interpret a rule that contains variables, the
rule has to be grounded. The grounding of each rule r in Π is then the set of
all rules obtained from substitutions of elements of HUΠ for the variables in
the rule r. By grounding all r ∈ Π, we obtain ground(Π).
The semantics of AnsProlog is defined in terms of answer sets. The an-
swer sets of program Π, are defined in terms of the answer sets of the ground
program ground(Π). An AnsProlog program without any naf-literal is de-
noted as Ansprolog−not. An answer set of an AnsProlog−not program Π is a
minimal subset (with respect to subset ordering) S of HB that is closed under
ground(Π). The approach to define the answer sets of an AnsProlog program
Π is to take a candidate answer set S of the program and transform Π with
respect to S to obtain an Ansprolog−not denoted by ΠS. S is an answer set of
Π if S is the answer set of AnsProlog−not program ΠS. This transformation is
referred to as Gelfond-Lifschitz (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988) transformation.
Given an AnsProlog program Π and a set S of atoms from HBΠ, the
47
Gelfond-Lifschitz (Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988) transformation ΠS is ob-
tained by deleting:
1. each rule that has a not L in its body with L ∈ S, and
2. literals of form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
The transformation (reduct) of choice rules was not a part of original Gelfond-
Lifschitz transformation and was introduced later in (Lee et al., 2008). Re-
cently a simplified reduct for programs including choice rules is proposed by
Mark Law and Broda (2015) as follows. Given an AnsProlog program Π -
with choice rules- and a set S of atoms from HBΠ, the transformation Π
S is
constructed in the following 4 steps:
1. Delete each rule that has a not L in its body with L ∈ S.
2. Delete literals of form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
3. for any choice rule r, l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − body(r), such that l ≤ |S ∩
{h0, · · · , hk}| ≤ u, replace r with the set of rules {hi : − body+(r)|hi ∈
S ∩ {h0, · · · , hk}}.
4. for any remaining choice rules r, l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − body(r), replace r
with the constraint : − body+(r).
After these transformation, the AnsProlog program Π is a program without
any naf-literals and choice rules and it is therefore, an AnsProlog−not, for
which the answer sets are already defined.
Proof. Let the execution of sequence of actions in pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉
bring about the sequence of states 〈s0, · · · sq〉. Let Mt be the set of following
atoms (and nothing else):
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q ·Mt |= state(k) (D.1)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · x ∈ sk ⇒Mt |= holdsat(x, k) (D.2)
∀k, 0 ≤ k < q · x ∈ (sk \ sk+1)⇒Mt |= terminated(x, k) (D.3)
∀a ∈ A ·Mt |= action(a, d) (D.4)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · a ∈ A, pr(a)+ ⊆ sk, pr(a)− 6∈ sk ⇒Mt |= pre(a, k) (D.5)
∀k, 0 ≤ k < q · (a, k) ∈̂ pi ⇒Mt |= executed(a, k) (D.6)
∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀k, ta ≤ k < ta + d(a) ·Mt |= inprog(a, k) (D.7)
∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀x ∈ ps(a)+ ·Mt |= holdsat(x, k + d(a)) (D.8)
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∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀x ∈ ps(a)− ·Mt |= terminated(x, k + d(a)− 1)
(D.9)
∀g ∈ G ·Mt |= goal(g, v) (D.10)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · g ∈ G, g+ ⊆ sk, g− 6∈ sk ⇒Mt |= satisfied(g, k) (D.11)
∀n ∈ N ·Mt |= norm(n, c) (D.12)
∀n = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 ∈ N.Mt |= executed(acon, tacon),
∀k, tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl·
Mt |= holdsat(o(n, tacon , asub, tacon + d(acon) + dl), k) (D.13)
∃k2, 0 ≤ k < q ·Mt |= holdsat(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2),Mt |= executed(a, k2),
k2! = dl
′ ⇒ Mt |= cmp(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.14)
∃k2, 0 ≤ k < q,Mt |= cmp(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒
Mt |= terminated(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.15)
∃k2, k2 = dl′,Mt |= holdsat(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒Mt |= vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)
(D.16)
∃k2, 0 ≤ k2 ≤ q,Mt |= vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒
Mt |= terminated(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.17)
∀n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl′〉 ∈ N.Mt |= executed(acon, tacon),
∀k, tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl′·
Mt |= holdsat(f(n, tacon , asub, tacon + d(acon) + dl′), k) (D.18)
∃k2, k2 = dl′,Mt |= holdsat(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒
Mt |= cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.19)
∃k2, 0 ≤ k2 ≤ q,Mt |= cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒
Mt |= terminated(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.20)
∀k2, 0 ≤ k2 < q ·Mt |= holdsat(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2),Mt |= executed(a, k2)⇒
Mt |= vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.21)
49
∃k2, 0 ≤ k2 ≤ q,Mt |= vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2)⇒
Mt |= terminated(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) (D.22)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= satisfied(g, k)⇒Mt |= satisfied(g) (D.23)
We need to prove that Mt is an answer set of ΠPBase. Therefore, we need
to demonstrate that Mt is a minimal model for Π
Mt
PBase. Let r ∈ ΠMtPBase be
an applicable rule. In order for Mt to be a model of Π
Mt
PBase, we need to show
that r is applied (i.e. Mt |= Head(r)). We will go through each rule in the
same order in Lines 1–43.
• r is of type rule in Line 1: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 2: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 3–4: because of Gelfond-Lifschitz transfor-
mation, we know that not terminated(x, s) is removed from this rule.
Combination of D.2 and D.3 for x at k gives Mt |= holdsat(x, k + 1).
• r is of type rule in Line 5: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 6: after Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, from
the body and description of this rule we have a ∈ A and pr(a)+ ∈ sk
and pr(a)− 6∈ sk, which with D.5 implies that Mt |= pre(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Line 7: any action a ∈ A can be executed in a state.
After the transformation for choice rules, we obtain ∀(a, k) ∈̂ pi we have
executed(a, k) : − action(a, d), state(k). and ∀(a, k) s.t. (a, k) ̂6∈ pi
we have : − action(a, d), state(k). With D.6, we know that Mt |=
executed(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Lines 8–9: inprog atoms originate from execution
of actions. From D.6 we know that ∀(a, k) ∈̂ pi,Mt |= executed(a, k).
Since a is executed with D.7 we have ∀k, ta ≤ k < ta + d(a),Mt |=
inprog(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Line 10: the head of this rule is empty. Since pi is
a plan and we have assumed the preconditions of actions in a plan are
hold while the actions are in progress, this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 11–12: the head of this rule is empty. Because
pi is a plan and we have assumed that two actions in a plan cannot have
exactly the same start state, this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 13–14: the body of this rule implies that the
add postconditions of an executed action a hold in the state in which
the action ends. Since ∀(a, k) ∈̂ pi,Mt |= executed(a, k), with D.8 we
have ∀x ∈ ps(a)+ ·Mt |= holdsat(x, k + d(a)).
50
• r is of type rule in Lines 15–16: the body of this rule implies that
the delete postconditions of an executed action a are terminated in
the state before the end state of the action. Since ∀(a, k) ∈̂ pi,Mt |=
executed(a, k), with D.9 we have ∀x ∈ ps(a)− ·Mt |= terminated(x, k+
d(a)− 1).
• r is of type rule in Line 17: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 18: after Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, from
the body and description of this rule we have g+ ∈ sk and g− 6∈ sk,
which with D.11 implies that Mt |= satisfied(g, k).
• r is of type rule in Line 19: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 20–21: the body of the rule implies that
normative fluents for obligations hold over the compliance period if
the action that is the condition of the norm is executed. If acon for
an obligation norm belongs to pi, then based on D.6 we know that
Mt |= executed(acon, tacon). From D.6 and D.13 we know that Mt |=
holdsat(o(n, k1, asub, tacon + d(acon) + dl
′), k2) over the period tacon +
d(acon) ≤ k2 ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl′.
• r is of type rule in Lines 22–23: this rule states that if the obliged action
is executed while the normative fluent holds, the norm is complied with.
If asub is executed in pi (Mt |= executed(acon, tacon)) while the normative
fluent in D.13 holds, with D.14 we know that Mt models the compliance
atom.
• r is of type rule in Lines 24–25: complied obligations are terminated in
the compliance state. With D.14 we know that Mt models compliance
atoms, and D.15 implies that they are terminated in the same state.
• r is of type rule in Lines 26–27: if the obligation fluent still holds when
the deadline occurs, the obligation is violated. D.16 implies this is
modelled by Mt.
• r is of type rule in Line 28–29: violated obligations are terminated
in the violation state. With D.16 we know that Mt models violation
atoms, and D.17 implies that they are terminated.
• r is of type rule in Lines 30–31: the body of the rule implies that
normative fluents for prohibition norms are hold over the compliance
period if the action that is the condition of the norm is executed. If
acon for a prohibition belongs to pi, then based on D.6 we know that
Mt |= executed(acon, tacon). From D.6 and D.18 we know that Mt |=
holdsat(f(n, k1, asub, tacon + d(acon) + dl
′), k2) over the period tacon +
d(acon) ≤ k2 ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl′.
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• r is of type rule in Lines 32–33: this rule states that if the normative
fluent still holds at the end of compliance period, the prohibition is
complied with. D.19 implies that Mt models the head of this rule.
• r is of type rule in Line 34–35: complied prohibitions are terminated
in the compliance state. With D.19 we know that Mt models compli-
ance atoms, and D.20 implies that they are terminated and this rule is
applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 36–37: this rule states that if the prohibited
action is executed while the normative fluent holds, the norm is vio-
lated. If asub is executed in pi (Mt |= executed(asub, tasub)) while the
normative fluent in D.18 holds, with D.21 we know that Mt models the
violation atom.
• r is of type rule in Line 38–39: violated prohibitions are terminated in
violation state. With D.21 we know that Mt models violation atoms,
and D.22 implies that they are terminated.
• r is of type rule in Line 40: this rule is applicable whenever a goal is
satisfied in a state. With D.11 and D.23 we can obtain this (Mt |=
satisfied(g)).
• r is of type rule in Line 41: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi
is a plan it has to satisfy at least one goal, so this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 42–43: the head of this rule is empty. Because
pi is a plan and a plan cannot contain concurrent execution of actions,
this rule is applied.
By showing that all the rules, apart from those not applicable, are applied,
we have shown that Mt is a model for Π
Mt
PBase.
Now, we need to show that Mt is minimal, which means that there exists
no other model of ΠMtPBase that is a subset of Mt.
Let M ⊂ Mt be a model for ΠMtPBase, then there must exist an atom
s ∈ (Mt \M). If s is an atom that is generated because it is a fact, it must
belong to M too and if that is not the case, then M cannot be a model. We
now proceed with the rest of atoms that do not appear as facts:
• s = executed(a, k): Mt |= s implies that r : executed(a, k) : − action(a,
d), state(k)., r ∈ ΠMtPBase. If M 6|= executed(a, k), then r was applicable
but not applied, therefore, M is not a model.
• s = holdsat(x, k): Mt |= s implies that one of the following four condi-
tion must have occurred:
– D.2: if this is the case then s was true in sk−1 (not terminated
is removed from the body of this rule because of the Gelfond-
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Lifschitz). In this case the construction of Mt guarantees Mt |=
holdsat(x, k− 1). If M 6|= holdsat(a, k) then rule in Lines 3–4 are
applicable but not applied, so M cannot be a model.
– D.8: if this is the case then we know Mt |= executed(a, k). Earlier
we showed that if Mt |= executed(a, k), then M |= executed(a, k)
too. Thus, if M 6|= holdsat(x, k + d(a)) for all x ∈ ps(a)+, then
rule in Lines 13–14 is applicable but not applied, so M cannot be
a model.
– D.13: if this is the case then x = o(n, k, asub, tacon + d(acon) +
dl). Because Mt is a model then Mt |= executed(acon, tacon). So
M |= executed(acon, tacon) too. Therefore, rule in Lines 20–21 is
applicable and if M 6|= s then this rule is not applied and M
cannot be a model.
– D.18: if this is the case then x = f(n, k, asub, tacon + d(acon) + dl).
Similar to reasoning above but instead of rule in Lines 20–21, rule
in Lines 30–31 is applicable.
• s = pre(a, k): Mt |= s implies that ∀x ∈ pr(a)+, x ∈ sk and ∀x ∈
pr(a)−, x 6∈ sk. If M is a model then according to the transformed
version of rule 6, M |= pre(a, k). If that is not the case, then M is not
a model.
• s = inprog(a, k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= executed(a, ta). There-
fore, M |= executed(a, ta). That means the rule in Lines 8–9 is appli-
cable and if ∀ta ≤ k < ta + d(a),M 6|= inprog(a, k) then this applicable
rule is not applied. Therefore M cannot be a model.
• s = cmp(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(o(n, k1,
a, dl′), k2) and also Mt |= executed(a, k2). Consequently, M |= holdsat
(o(n, k1, a, dl
′), k2) and M |= executed(a, k2). As a result, rule in Lines
22–23 is applicable and if M 6|= s, the rule is not applied and M is not
a model.
• s = vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(o(n, k1,
a, dl′), k2) and also k2 = dl′. Because M is a model we know that M |=
holdsat(o(n, k1, a, dl
′), k2). As a result, rule in Line 27 is applicable and
if M 6|= vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k2), the rule is not applied and M is not a
model.
• s = cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2): Mt |= s implies thatMt |= holdsat(f(n, k1,
a, dl′), k2) and also k2 = dl′. Because M is a model we know that
M |= holdsat(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) too. As a result rule in Lines 32–33 is
applicable and if M 6|= cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2), the rule is not applied
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and M is not a model.
• s = vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(f(n, k1,
a, dl′), k2) and also Mt |= executed(a, k2). Consequently, we know that
M |= holdsat(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2) and M |= executed(a, k2). As a result
rule in Lines 36–37 is applicable and if M 6|= vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k2), the
rule is not applied and M is not a model.
• s = terminated(x, k): Mt |= s implies that one of the following five
situations hold:
– D.9: if this is the case then Mt |= executed(a, k− d(a) + 1). If M
is a model M |= executed(a, k− d(a) + 1). Thus, the rule in Lines
15–16 is applicable and if M 6|= terminated(s, k) then the rule is
applicable but not applied, which means that M is not a model.
– D.15 and D.17: if this is the case x = o(n, k2, a, dl
′) ∈ sk, and
Mt |= cmp(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k) or Mt |= vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k). Since
M is a model, then if Mt |= cmp(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k) the same applies
to M and if Mt |= vol(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k) again the same applies to
M . In either case, according to rule in Lines 24–25 and rule in
Lines 28–29, M |= terminated(o(n, k1, a, dl′), k) or M is not a
model.
– D.20 and D.22: if this is the case x = f(n, k1, a, dl
′) ∈ sk, and
Mt |= cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k) or Mt |= vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k). Since
M is a model, if Mt |= cmp(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k) the same applies to
M and if Mt |= vol(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k) again the same applies to M .
In either case, according to rule in Lines 34–35 and rule in Lines
38–39, M |= terminated(f(n, k1, a, dl′), k) or M is not a model.
• s = satisfied(g, k): Mt |= s implies that ∀x ∈ g+, x ∈ sk and ∀x ∈
g−, x 6∈ sk. If M is a model then according to the transformed version
of rule 18 M |= satisfied(g, k) and if that is not the case then M is
not a model.
• s = satisfied(g): Mt |= s because Mt |= satisfied(g, k). Since Mt |=
satisfied(g, k), according to previous item M |= satisfied(g, k) too,
therefore rule 40 is applicable and M |= satisfied(g) or it is not a
model.
The combination of these items demonstrates that M cannot be a model for
ΠMtPBase if it differs from Mt. Mt is therefore a minimal model for Π
Mt
PBase and
an answer set for ΠPBase.
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